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 Abstract 
 
Substantial research has been devoted to the party systems in Eastern Europe since the 
demise of the communism, concerning how political parties respond to liberal reform 
and what competitive patterns it produce. The dominant explanations have been 
revolving around theories on ‘communist regime types’, explaining the agency of 
political parties as a product of the structural legacy. Recent empirical findings reveal 
that political structures in Eastern Europe admit to far higher variation, and argue that 
federal structures together with ethnic minority relations have informed political 
competition.  
 
This case study builds on the latter argument and researches the ideological formation 
in Serbia and Croatia by examining how political parties respond to LGBT-rights. The 
study has an explanatory design and proposes that party response to LGBT-rights has 
been framed by preceding conflict over ethnic minority rights. 
 
The empirical material has been collected during two months in the field and builds 
on in-depth interviews with representatives of minority rights organizations and 
political parties. The material has been collected to understand how ethnic relations 
affected the ideological formation and how it is associated with the framing of LGBT-
rights. 
 
The findings suggest that party response to LGBT-rights is stipulated by a strong 
ethnic norm, being a product of ethnic nationalism and a conservative turn following 
the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia. The study proposes that the extent to which 
political parties are affiliated to this norm is the major ideological distinction in 
capacity of explaining different reactions to LGBT-rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The political systems in Eastern Europe in general, and in the Balkans in particular, 
are often described as unpredictable and unstable. The atrocities of war in transition 
and political authoritarianism in ex-Yugoslavia have shocked many and been subject 
to extensive research. In response to this puzzle, literature has sought to explain the 
dysfunctional features, sometimes at the expense of overlooking relevant detail to the 
structure of the political competition.  
 
This inquiry addresses this structure by examining party response to LGBT-rights in 
Serbia and Croatia, two ex-republics of Yugoslavia that have produced mirroring 
political structures. While the ‘left’ in Croatia is relatively liberal, the ‘left’ in Serbia 
is relatively conservative, as the two communist successor parties went down different 
ideological pathways. The political competition is essentially reversed, forming an 
ideological paradox where being ‘left’ and ‘right’ have acquired different meanings.  
 
The lion share of scholarship concerned with political structures in ex-Yugoslavia has 
revolved around the theory on ‘communist regime legacies’, seeing political action as 
a path-dependent product of the preceding structural legacy. The logic to the 
divergent ideological outcomes is subsequently explained in terms of institutional 
differences (Kitschelt, 1995, Kitschelt, 1999).  
 
This argument might underestimate the effect of the most well known significant to 
ex-Yugoslavia, that is, the emergence of the armed conflict that tore the social and 
political legacy on which Yugoslav communism once relied apart. Such conflict 
cannot arise in the absence of social tensions, nor can such conflict occur without 
persisting political implications. This thesis is deduced from the argument that the 
rationale to political competition in this case is stipulated by the significance of the 
federal legacy together with ethnic minority relations – evidently being the main 
source of distinction in ex-Yugoslavia (Rovny, 2012).  
 
This critically demonstrates how latently embedded social tensions interacted with the 
communist legacy to inform a structure of party competition, and its tenacity is 
reflected in present conflicts over emerging social issues. The research illuminates 
how these prospects are being reproduced as the ideological frame gets translated into 
new conflicts. This thesis confirms the endurance of this pattern by specifically 
addressing how party response to LGBT-rights is correlated to this pre-existing 
ideological structure.  
 
LGBT-rights concern the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bi and Transgendered persons to be 
able to express their sexual orientation without fear of discrimination, harassment and 
to have social rights equal to the heterosexual majority (European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, FRA, 2013).  
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A recent report from the FRA shows that 47% of the LGBT-respondents had felt 
harassed during the previous year, while showing that an additional one in four had 
been threatened with violence or been attacked within the last five years (FRA, EU-
LGBT Survey, 2013). 
 
The status of the LGBT-community in Serbia and Croatia is no exception: statistics 
indicates that 80% of respondents in Serbia and 52% in Croatia morally condemn 
homosexual acts (Gallup, 2012). As follows, the status of the LGBT-community has 
been disputed, and its controversial position reflected in the violent attacks on the 
Pride Parade in Belgrade 2010 and on the Split Pride Parade in 2011. The LGBT-
community hence faces critical challenges and is dependent upon social recognition 
and political support to break the line of prejudice. As stated by the FRA; “Open 
support by politicians makes LGBT persons feel more comfortable about living as 
LGBT persons” (FRA, EU-LGBT Survey, 2013). 
 
This inquiry argues that the political response to LGBT-rights in Serbia and Croatia 
lies within the ideological paradox that was consolidated as ex-Yugoslavia 
disintegrated. The structural background of Yugoslavia together with the dynamics of 
its collapse shaped the ideological frame. It shows how the atrocious conflict 
following the demise of Yugoslavia, despite its deeply gruesome nature, came out 
with an ideological structure. 
 
This structure illuminates a broader ideological pattern and reveals a rationale behind 
party response to LGBT-rights. The overarching tendency is closely linked to prior 
conflicts and ethnic relations, in which national pride consequently goes together with 
anti-LGBT sentiments and prejudice. 
1.2 Aim 
 
The objective of this research is to account for the divergent structures of party 
competition in Serbia and Croatia. The inquiry is designed to investigate the ideology 
of the major political parties, in which party preferences are reproduced in the current 
debate over LGBT-rights. 
 
The aim of this research is hence twofold: 
 
1) To build a theoretical argument to the ideological conflict in Serbia and 
Croatia, by testing how ethnic relations have informed the structure of party 
competition. 
2) To illustrate how this conflict has produced an enduring ideological structure, 
which serves as a frame to party positions on LGBT-rights.  
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2. Literature review 
 
This section draws upon propositions seeking to explain the overarching variables to 
post-communist politics. While addressing the centrality of political competition, it 
discusses the propensity of the established claims in relation to the structuration of 
party competition in Serbia and Croatia. It finds current theory on ‘communist regime 
types’ insufficient to the case, which abides by the logic of social cleavages informed 
by other structures.   
 
2.1 Structured or unorganized: What is particular about post-
communism? 
 
The literature on transition from communist authoritarianism to liberal democracy 
illuminates how communist systems respond to liberal reform and what socio-political 
outcomes it produces. This has placed scholars in two conflicting theoretical camps; 
one side claims that the transition produced a lack of political structure, the other side 
that there is a structure and that it is stipulated by communist legacies.     
 
Parts of the scholarship suggest that post-communist reforms failed, while suffering 
from high corruption levels and a lack of coherent legislation (Andreas, 2004, 
Karklins, 2002). Similar arguments put forth that the institutionalization of the party 
systems is insufficient, where civil society is subordinate to partisan politics, and 
political systems fluid and inconsistent (Schöpfin, 1991, Biealasiak, 2002, Djurkovic, 
2006). Many hence define political competition in Eastern Europe as diffuse and 
idiosyncratic, with high voter volatility and a lack of differentiation among the 
political parties (Bielasiak, 1997, Innes, 2002, Ost, 1993).  
 
The dominant counter-argument is informed by the causal effect of communist 
legacies, i.e. that differences in the institutional structure of communism have 
produced divergent political outcomes. Parties are accordingly path-dependent and 
guided through the democratization by pre-existing structural frameworks (Kitschelt, 
1992, Kitschelt, 1995). These are broadly derived from two main variables, one being 
the character of the bureaucratic rule and the other the means by which the system 
reached civic compliance (Kitschelt et al., 1999, pp. 21-24). This implies that 
communism eroded former values and that political competition is informed by 
institutional legacies. The legacies are operationalized as communist regime types, 
which determine the agency of the communist-successor parties and the strength of 
the opposition, serving as a structural frame for political competition in comparative 
research (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009, Ishiyama, 1999, Markowski, 1997, Kitschelt, 
1995). 
 
This claim suggests that political competition is to be captured in two dimensions, one 
being economic left-right and the other liberal-conservative on social issues. Whereas 
the former concerns the balance between economic independence and state 
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intervention, the latter regards preferences on cultural issues and social practise 
(Hooghe et al., 2002). The dividing potency of these cleavages constitutes issue 
dimensions around which ideology is composed between competing poles (Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967). 
 
As communist rule aligned economic left with state authoritarianism, the ‘left’ 
inherently became socially conservative, and the systemic response was that the 
opposition acquired an agenda of right-wing economic policy and social liberalism 
(Marks et al., 2006, Hooghe et al., 2002). This entails a causal structure to party 
competition in CEE, being stretched between a leftist-conservative and right-wing-
liberal pole in accordance with the inherited implications of ‘communist regime 
legacies. Post-communist structures hence abide by the same causality as the West, 
but have produced mirror-imaging outcomes due to the reversed issue dimensions. 
 
These outcomes are explained in detail in accordance with three different ‘communist 
regime legacies’: the bureaucratic-authoritarian, the national-accommodative and the 
patrimonial, serving as a categorization to the variations of the communist systems  
(Kitschelt, 1999).  
 
Patrimonial communism strongly repressed anti-communist sentiments, it obstructed 
any civic organization as the communist party had been, and remained, the 
indisputable institution for progress. The transition is hence the competition between a 
strong communist successor and a dispersed opposition, leading to a state where the 
communist successor protects its interest and produces weaker prospects for liberal 
contenders.  In contrast, the national-accommodative legacy separated party rule from 
the technical administration of the state, making a more democratic distinction. This 
legacy served as a fundament for a stronger opposition to the communist rule, as the 
communist party lacked the ideological hegemony evident under patrimonial 
communism. This leads to a negotiated transition between communist successor 
parties and stronger liberal opposition, in accordance with previously organized 
interests (Kitschelt, 1999, pp. 21-30).   
 
The transition from patrimonial communism is expected to generate an outcome of an 
authoritarian system with a strong conservative communist successor party and 
dispersed liberal opposition. The national-accommodative legacy is expected to 
produce reform of the communist successor party towards social democracy, in 
negotiation with organized liberal opposition, to produce a moderate system of 
proportional representation (Kitschelt, 1999, pp. 32-35). These structural pre-
conditions are hence proclaimed to stipulate the balance between liberal vis-à-vis 
conservative prospects post-communism. These legacies are hence explanatory to the 
structuration of political competition, being derived from the institutional features of 
communism. 
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2.2 Social cleavages in the aftermath of communism 
 
Other research suggests that there is a higher variability in the competitive patterns of 
East Europe, which points to different relations between party competition and social 
bases. While scrutinizing the political structures, it suggests that more context-specific 
variables might be significant in order to comprehend party competition (Evans & 
Whitefield, 1993, Whitefield, 2002, p. 194-195). It shows that social issues can be 
superior to communist legacies, or, can interact with communist legacies to co-
determine the structure of party competition (Evans & Whitefield 1993, p. 540-541). 
The ideological formation might hence not be bound to institutional features 
stipulated solely by the structural features of the communist apparatus, but by social 
cleavages beyond these factors.  
 
A third set of propositions elaborate on the impact of federal structures, suggesting 
that central-peripheral arrangements informed different social relations and hence 
divergent issue dimensions within the federations. This affected social affinities and 
gave the integration of the communist doctrine contradicting regional implications 
(Bunce, 1999). An important notion for the related propositions is that the federal 
structures tended to breed incitements for self-determination, and that it informed 
conflicting views between centre and periphery following the dismemberment of the 
federations (Trbovic 2009, Chap. 4, Dorff, 1994, Bebler, 1993).  
 
As communism had made class-identification secondary, federal identities could be a 
way of acquiring legitimacy that could not be alleged through class (Linz & Stepan, 
1992). Later literature elaborates on how these relations increased the cultivation of 
national identity, which became a cornerstone in communist federations (Bunce, 
2004, pp. 417-427). Communism (despite its internationalist agenda) hence enforced 
the ethnic dimension in order to maintain the federal hegemony, which evolved into 
an ethnic particularism in the peripheral states. Slezkine eloquently describes the 
federal nationalism as a ‘communal apartment’, where the different, and ethnically 
distinguished, republics within the federation occupied different rooms. They were 
left with a crucial question as communism deteriorated: “Should they convert their 
living area into a proper apartment?” (Slezkine,1994, pp. 452) 
 
More recent research has devoted attention to how ethnic relations and federal 
structures have interplayed to compose another issue dimension and hence other 
ideological prospects. It proposes that political competition is the product of a legacy 
stipulated by the federal relations and the significance of ethnic relations. The 
research critically suggests that embedded social affinities interacted with federal 
structures to produce a different competitive pattern, with conflicts over ethnic 
minority rights being the most critical. It argues that the legacy of ethno-federalism in 
some cases challenges the current predictions of communist regime legacies (Bunce, 
2005, Rovny, 2012, 2013).  
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While states without significant ethnic tensions have had successful democratic 
transitions, some states with ethnic cleavages experienced severe problems. Broad 
scholarship support that majority-minority relations and ethnic affinity has been 
central in Eastern Europe, being an important component to the development of the 
political systems (Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001, Dowley & Silver, 2002) As the ex-
republics of ex-Yugoslavia proved highly reluctant to apply a liberal approach to 
ethnic diversity, they went through a unique and violent transition (Hayden, 1996).  
The nature of this conflict seemingly goes beyond the more instrumental matrix 
provided by “communist regime legacies”, while revealing an alternative (ethnic) 
issue dimension to the ideological prospects in post-communist politics. 
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3. Problem formulation 
 
In sum there are three sides of the literature: one refers to post-communist politics as a 
laggard heritage of communism, another side recognizes a structure and attributes it to 
the details of the structural heritage. The third side challenges these claims, while 
arguing that the competitive pattern is stipulated by conflicts over critical social 
divides, in this case - ethnic minority rights.  
 
This inquiry builds on the research of Rovny, who argues that the legacy of ethno-
federalism together with ethnic minority relations serve as a frame for political 
competition (2012, 2013). This qualitative assessment is developed from existing 
theory to test if the frame of the proposed ethno-federal legacy gets translated into 
new conflicts. The theoretical contribution hence researches whether this legacy has 
informed persisting political relations, and is ultimately a test as to whether ideology 
can travel onto new domains and issues.  
 
The forthcoming theoretical propositions are building on previous theory, but are 
elaborated in relation to the context. The claims are elaborated in order to approach a 
more adequate understanding to the ideological mechanisms behind party response to 
LGBT-rights in Serbia and Croatia, suggesting that these are preceded by, and rooted 
in, previous conflicts. 
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4. Theory: The political norm 
 
“Insofar as political actors act by making choices, they act within definitions of 
alternatives, consequences, preferences (interests), and strategic options that are 
strongly affected by the institutional context in which the actors find themselves.” 
(March & Olsen 1996, p. 251) 
 
The inquiry departs from a sociological perspective on institutions, being concerned 
with how the creation of identities and institutions affects the political structure. This 
perspective recognizes that political actions are embedded in the institutions and rules 
that are sustained and interpreted in the political system (March & Olsen 1996). 
Political action is hence treated in a normative frame, where the identity of the actor 
defines how she recognizes the situation. The rationale to political action is seen as a 
product of collective values and rules accumulated within institutions, and the nature 
of political action is derived from what is appropriate in accordance with these rules. 
How an actor recognizes a situation and why she takes certain decisions is ultimately 
stipulated by her identity, i.e. how she identifies herself in relation to the given 
institutional environment of rules and values. Political actors, and political actions, are 
ultimately embedded in this matrix of social relations, in which collective norms 
stipulate logic of appropriate action (March & Olsen, 1994, Weber et al., 2004).  
 
Political competition is an institutionalized conflict over value-commitment, 
originating from contradicting views on social practise. Conflict occurs over social 
cleavages, whose polarizing effect is aggregated into the political system. This 
political contest reflects actors’ internalized perceptions of what is appropriate, and 
political ideology is the reflexive product of how collective norms and values are 
interpreted and translated into action (Lipset & Rokkan, 1990, pp. 113-119). This 
research relies on the notion that political action and institutional structures exercise 
mutual effect, emphasizing that political action is to be understood as an embedded 
product of this collective entity.  
 
Political competition and ideological reactions are never taking place in a vacuum, but 
in a cluster of norms and guidelines. Ideology is always relative to the context, just as 
social norms. Political competition must consequently be analysed in the normative 
setting, being explanatory to different positions. 
4.1 Theoretical propositions 
 
The forthcoming propositions emphasize that ideology in Serbia and Croatia 
originates from a pre-existing issue dimension, co-determined by the federal 
structures of Yugoslavia and the ethnic composition of the ex-republics. These 
conditions informed a political norm, around which conflicting views are explanatory 
to ideological positions.  
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The Yugoslav communism eventually had to collapse in order to democratize, and the 
wars eventually destroyed most of the legacy on which Yugoslavia was previously 
consolidated (Magas, 1993). This proposition sees the political developments in the 
context of institutional breakdown rather than structural path-dependency. 
 
In a metaphorical sense, the dissolution of the authoritarian institutions following the 
demise of Yugoslav communism is defined as a structural void. The structural void 
refers to a lack of coherent legislation and institutional capacity, but is not to confuse 
with a general void, which would resemble a state of social paralysis. The experience 
of Serbia and Croatia illustrates how the structural void particularly accommodated 
ethnic tensions, which had remained latently embedded under communism. The 
former suppression of these claims gave birth to a political discourse whose 
conservative aspects cultivated latent ethnic identities. Ethnic sentiments thus became 
exploited as a political trajectory, enhanced by the features of the structural void.  
 
Ethnic claims can be essential to the construction of boundaries and the production 
meaning in the political space, hence being potent to divide certain groups while 
unifying others (Nagel, 1994, Fearon & Laitin, 2000). The political structuration in 
ex-Yugoslavia demonstrated these implications and underlines the ideological 
importance of how ethnic claims were constructed – shown similarly by the 
structuration of the Yugoslav state and the response of ethnic exploitation following 
its demise. The consequences are thereby not a clash amongst primordial civilizations, 
but the devastating outcome of politicized ethnic claims in a state of transitional 
confusion. 
 
The political incorporation of ethnicity served as a social base for identification, and 
while ethnic affiliation was cultivated as a social base for self-identification, it also 
emerged as the natural source of distinction between particular groups and interests 
within the frames of the structural void. This interconnection between ethnic affinity 
and group interest, or more accurately, the politicization of ethnic identity, required a 
‘significant other’.  
 
“Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness 
in order to secure its own self-certainty” (Connolly 2002, p. 64). 
 
Identity is consolidated through the constitution of difference, legitimized and 
reassured through the construction of the significant other (Connolly, 2002, pp. 11-
15). Identity is hence always relational, established in relation to a series of socially 
recognized differences. These distinctions essentially guide actions, define us in 
relation to our environment and breed social structures. It is ultimately how we define 
others and how others define us, a paradox of similarities and differences, that breed 
consensus and foster conflict (Kearney, 2003, pp. 5-10, Connolly, 2002 pp. 64-68).  
 
While ethnic relations embarked the incitements of the structural void, the position of 
‘the other’ was accordingly ascribed to ethnic minorities who lived outside the 
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domain of their ‘home republic’. This served as a base for political and social self-
identification, as an instrument for inclusion and exclusion, eventually as a 
determinant to the political system of rewards and sanctions. This dictated power 
relations, whose balance informed the degree to which ‘the other’ could be treated as 
an integrated part of the political domain. Ethnic claims furthermore have the 
advantage of making political power exclusive to a particular group (Nagel and 
Olzak, 1982, Fearon, 1995). This process had an inherited political dimension, in 
which certain ethnic communities were attributed positive or negative connotations.  
 
Just as the structural void was born as a consequence of radical institutional 
transformation and collapse, the essence of ethnic tensions was revived in absence of 
other structures. Conflicting views over minority rights hence embarked the structural 
void and acquired high significance as a source of political distinction, becoming 
important to the formation of ideology and a political (ethnic) identity. The 
construction of ‘the other’ was at the heart of this process, and this inquiry suggests it 
might have more far-reaching ideological implications.  
 
H1: Conflicting views on ethnic minority rights affected ideological formation 
and positioned parties in relation to a notion of ‘otherness’.  
 
“It is this proclivity to demonize alterity as a menace to our collective identity which 
so easily issues in hysterical stories about invading enemies” (Kearney, 2003, p. 65).  
 
The electoral winners in the first free elections in Serbia and Croatia pursued radical 
nationalism, predominantly used as a partisan political feature to justify authoritarian 
(ethnic) self-righteousness. The central notion of this proposition is the remark that 
there was an opposition to the forces behind the authoritarian regimes, and that this 
dynamic structured the political competition. The views on ethnic minority rights and 
territorial claims distinguished them in relation to each other. The contest over ethnic 
minority rights thus became endemic to the structure of the party competition and a 
characteristic of the political systems (Dimitras, 2002, pp. 186-189).  
 
This is rooted in the demise of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), 
where the federal duality bred an interest conflict between the federal center in 
Belgrade and the peripheral states. Conflict erupted as the political majority on both 
sides bound prospects of self-determination to ethnic affinity, hence polarizing the 
political structures along ethnic claims to become a source of political and territorial 
justification. The center-peripheral dispute evolved into an ethno-federal conflict as 
ethnic claims were enhanced. 
 
The conflict was enforced by the rhetoric of the prevailing political coalitions and 
informed a state where ethnic minorities and other conflicting interests were treated as 
threats. These tensions reversed the pre-existing social order, where ethnic groups 
previously protected by constitutional rights became targets of partisan political 
response to the transitional challenges (Massey, Hodson & Sekulic, 1999). Ethnic 
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minorities emerged at the focal point when establishing boundaries and defining the 
state, while disrupting the proclaimed pattern of ethnic affinity (Rovny, 2012). The 
systems of Serbia and Croatia hence became authoritarian and illiberal in the sense 
that ethnic minorities were stigmatized, and that a pluralistic solution to the state was 
ruled out.  
 
As parties frequently identify and expose the most salient social cleavage in pursuit of 
their ideology, they become more or less compatible with a pluralist democracy. It 
terms whether the ideology is inclusive or exclusive, determining the political culture 
of participation and serves as a predictor for either an authoritarian or pluralistic 
position (Alford & Friedland, 1985, pp. 61-66). This is reflected in the political 
competition, and the extent to which groups are given a degree of autonomy the 
primary characteristic of these political systems. The conflict over ethnic minority 
rights stipulated, on the one hand, the level of authority and control to partitioned over 
ethnic minorities, and on the other, the level of autonomy and integrity to be granted.  
 
In this respect it is critical to emphasize that there was an opposition to the 
authoritarian state of order, primarily characterized as a pro-democratic movement for 
peace and integration of the civic society. The opposition was diffuse in the sense that 
the political messages were disparate, but shared the common denominator of being 
regime critical and opposed to ethnic conflict. As this opposition became politically 
organized, it antagonized the authoritarian rule by pursuing a pro-democratic agenda. 
As the political conflict had turned ‘ethnic’, the primary distinction was made in 
regards to different views on ethnic minority rights.  
 
The political conflict was hence formed around two competitive poles originating 
from ethnic tensions, one being ethnic-authoritarian and the other pluralist-liberal.  
 
The nature of this issue informed the balance between autonomy and control, and 
political conflict over ethnic minority rights separated authoritarian and pro-
democratic actors. Whereas the ethnic-authoritarian leadership pursued authority and 
control, the opposition to a higher degree sought to protect the rights of ethnic 
minorities. This came to define the contradiction between the majority (the norm) and 
minorities (the other), and while being annexed in political competition structured 
party positions in accordance with preferences on this overarching issue.  
 
This proposition claims that the ethnic conflict, albeit having the potential to tear 
down structures, also fostered structuration in terms of different political preferences 
on the notion of ‘otherness’. It illustrates that ethnic conflict, despite manifesting great 
potency to organize illiberal forces, also defined the organization of political 
resistance in each state as more liberal. It critically claims that the systems in Serbia 
and Croatia are not the combined product of illiberal forces, but the condensed 
outcome of how political parties positioned themselves during previous conflicts.  
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The ideological story of ex-Yugoslavia originates from this crossroad, where political 
parties in Serbia and Croatia diverged in different directions. These pathways entail a 
broader set of values and serve as a compass to how parties will navigate through 
ideological junctions ahead. Will they approach or avoid ‘the other’?  
 
 
   Ethnic minority rights  
 
            Anti                  Pro 
 
 
 Pro 
 
      LGBT-rights 
 
Anti 
 
 
 
H2: The political contest over ethnic minority rights has, despite its disrupting 
nature, informed the structuration of party competition and consolidated 
ideological cleavages.  
4.2 An assessment on federalism in ex-Yugoslavia 
 
Broad literature highlights the complex federal composition of ex-Yugoslavia, dating 
back to the late 19th century as the question of ‘nationhood’ was awoken and the 
Balkans was torn between the Ottoman Empire in the East and the Habsburg Empire 
in the West. Borders were re-drawn multiple times in accordance with then existing 
power relations, eventually followed by the first and second World Wars (Trbovich 
2008, pp. 64-92).  
 
The SFRY was created under these conditions, as communist leader Josip Broz Tito 
was requested by Stalin to instigate a movement of resistance. This appealed to the 
majority of ethnic groups who were attracted to the proclaimed policy of 
‘Brotherhood and Unity’, on which the SFRY ultimately was consolidated. The SFRY 
inherited the complexity of past events, where internal borders were based upon 
historical treaties of empires and cultural distinctions, with diffuse demarcations 
between the federal states. 
 
“The party and the state merged and Yugoslavia's constitutions consequently did not 
pose legal authority. The legal principles of self-determination, federalism, and 
minority rights acquired a distorted meaning in the Yugoslav framework.” (Trbovich 
2008, p. 141)    
 
  
Pluralist-
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Ethnic-
Authoritarian 
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The SFRY then consisted of six federal republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, including Voivodina and Kosovo, 
the two autonomous provinces of Serbia. Due to the rich history of the region, many 
groups were living outside of their ‘home republics’ domain. As followed, 
“individuals retained their national right to self governance even if they lived outside 
their home nations republic” (Woodward 1995: 36). The focal point of complexity 
was that national identification (minority languages, proportional representation) was 
enhanced by the constitution, while expression of political nationalism was strictly 
repressed. The constitution hence enforced national identities in the republics as a 
right of equality, while simultaneously promoting a higher Yugoslav identity 
(Woodward 1995: 29-35, Sekulic, Massey & Hodson, 1994). 
 
The SFRY was stable under the leadership of Tito and had shown relatively high 
cohesion among ethnic groups (Massey, Hodson & Sekulic, 1999). The implications 
were revealed first after the death of Tito in 1980 and followed by the disintegration 
of the SFRY, which exposed the fragility of the cohesion (Woodward, 1995, p. 45-
46). As the communist structures deteriorated, and civil society incrementally 
disintegrated, ethnicity turned into a social cleavage and its salience increased (Linz 
& Stepan, 1992). 
 
The conflict ignited when Slovenia, followed by Croatia, sought independence and 
decided to secede from the Yugoslav state, hence dissolving the constitutional 
structures of Yugoslavia. Serbia (then Yugoslavia), being the federal center, proved 
highly reluctant to abandon the idea of a united Yugoslav federation. This conflict is, 
as often made true, not ethnic by nature, but was as much about state autonomy and 
control, about the status of socialism in relation to liberalization and independence 
(Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007). The political discourse especially aligned ethnic affinity 
with territorial claims, which evolved into an armed conflict during the 
dismemberment of Yugoslavia, as the internal borders were subject to conflict 
(Pickering & Baskin, 2008, Lake & Rothchild, 1996).  
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5. Method 
 
This chapter introduces the design by justifying the case selection. It furthermore 
engages in a discussion on how the empirical material is gathered and treated within 
the study. It is concluded and summarized in a discussion on the strengths and 
limitations of the inquiry in general.  
5.1 Case selection 
 
The definition of what a case study is has been subject to debate among scholars, as 
the building of a case is subjective. One researcher might interpret a chain of events or 
circumstances in a certain way, others might frame it differently. This inquiry treats it 
as “an empirical inquiry that investigates the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context that are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). 
 
The phenomenon is party response to LGBT-rights, the context Serbia and Croatia 
and the boundaries the theoretical propositions of this inquiry. The theoretical core 
revolves around how ideology is constructed in the post-communist setting; why do 
political parties adopt certain values and how does it affect their ideological 
orientation?  
 
The case is selected on the basis that the left-right positions in Serbia and Croatia are 
associated with different values. The crux of the problem lies within the variation at 
the party-level, where ‘left’ and ‘right’ has acquired different meaning. Recent 
empirical findings reveal that the ideological dimensions are mirroring each other, 
aligning the parties in each state to contradictory values on a liberal-conservative 
scale. 
 
Party positions in Serbia and Croatia (Rovny, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
  15 
The graphs illustrate that the communist successor party in Serbia (SPS) is socially 
conservative, while its counter part (SDP) in Croatia is the most socially liberal. The 
same dynamic informs the right-wing positions, with the Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ) being socially conservative and the Democratic Party (DS) in Serbia socially 
liberal.  
 
This structure deviates from the propositions of ‘communist regime legacies’, where 
Serbia is classified as a part of the patrimonial legacy and Croatia is treated as 
national-accommodative. It partly contradicts these propositions, as the communist 
successor party in Croatia is unexpectedly liberal, whereas the successor party in 
Serbia emerged as radically conservative.  
 
The most striking feature of these findings is that Serbia and Croatia, as two ex-
republics of the same federation – with similar experiences of communist rule and 
shared experiences in terms of a violent transition - have produced completely 
different structures of party competition. The old ideological hegemons, i.e. the 
communist successor parties, evidently went down different pathways, towards 
conservatism vis-à-vis liberalism. In turn, this affected the ideological formation and 
produced divergent prospects. Whereas the party competition still pends between a 
conservative and liberal pole, it has aligned the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ in each state to 
opposite sides. To be ‘left’ and ‘right’ in these cases is hence associated with different 
values, forming an ideological paradox. 
 
The case-selection has been made in response to this picture in order to propose an 
explanation to how ideology is constructed and how it affects the ideological framing 
of LGBT-rights.  
5.2 Delimitations 
 
It is crucial to state that Serbia and Croatia are two distinctly different states, with 
differences ranging from socio-cultural aspects to economic development. Most 
importantly, Croatia is finishing the accession negotiations with the EU, while Serbia 
is waiting for a date to initiate the accession process. The accession negotiations 
critically demand the involved political actors to adapt to “European values”, hence to 
legislate in order with the acquis communautaire. Any political party that is serious 
about European integration hence confess to “European values” and will support the 
legislation that is required within this process. In this sense, the EU-accession might 
force certain actors to push issues that can be contrary to their ideological agenda. 
While a lot of research has been conducted on how parties respond to European 
integration, this study is not concerned with the extent to which the EU exercises an 
effect, but with how ideology is constructed and reflected within the cases. 
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5.3 Case design 
 
This inquiry has proposed that conflict over ethnic minority rights has been the 
guiding theme to ideological formation and seeks to test if it applies to the framing of 
new issues. The case is grown out of the ambition to explain how past issues gets 
associated with new ones, and how ideology is constructed and reflected. The inquiry 
is hence designed to test the ideological tenacity, by examining how prior views on 
ethnic minority rights coincide with the framing of party preferences on LGBT-rights.  
 
The material has consequently been gathered to learn as much as possible about 1) 
how ethnic minority relations interplayed with political structures, and 2) if this 
ideological structure is reproduced in conflicts over LGBT-rights. The correlation 
between these two issues is consequently treated as an ideological rationale, being 
explanatory to how parties react to LGBT-rights and why they react differently.  
 
To collect the material on political parties is the obvious choice as the case is 
concerned with their ideological preferences, and the parties have been selected on the 
basis of their theoretical relevance for the case. The parties in scope of this study are 
the communist successor parties and the major opposition party to the communist 
successors in each state. The research is complemented with the Serbian Progressive 
Party (SNS), currently the most influential actor in Serbian politics. 
 
The Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) 
 
The SPS is the communist successor party of The League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia. It won majority the first elections in 1989 under the leadership of 
Slobodan Milosevic and ruled Serbia during the 1990’s, in periods in coalition with 
the SRS (Serbian Radical Party).   
 
Democratic Party (DS) 
 
DS was funded in 1989 and became the main opposition party towards Milosevic’s 
SPS-regime, representing one of many actors in a broad spectrum of oppositional 
forces. As the SPS was defeated in the national elections in 2000, the president of DS 
(Zoran Djindjic) was appointed Prime Minister of Serbia.  
 
The Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) 
 
The SNS originates from the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and was founded in 2008. 
The SRS is, and was, ruled by the ex-paramilitary Vojislav Seselj. The SRS was 
violently nationalist and radical, and albeit currently awaiting trial at the ICTY in Den 
Haag, Seselj is still party president. As the SNS was founded, it maintained a patriotic 
agenda, but officially deviated from the radicalism of the SRS. SNS has been a 
political success story and reached 40% of the popular vote in the 2012 elections.   
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The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
 
The HDZ is a conservative right-wing party that has been in majority from 1990 
to2000 and 2003 to 2010, having been formed in 1989 as a dissident party in 
opposition to Yugoslav communism.   
 
The Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)  
 
The SDP is the former successor party of The League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
and was renamed after the defeat in the 1990 elections. The SDP constituted the 
opposition to the HDZ-regime, held office from 2000 to 2003 and regained majority 
once again in the 2010 elections.  
5.4 Collection of the material  
Political parties aim for power and representation, and are most likely to be successful 
if they give to the voters what the voters want, while sparing them from that which 
they fear. The political sphere hence has an inherited nature of not wanting to deal 
with issues that are sensitive or unpopular, not to mention both. The rights of ethnic 
and sexual minorities are typical examples of such issues in ex-Yugoslavia. As 
follows, nothing is written about minority rights in the election programmes, and few 
controversial statements in a ‘negative’ direction are made officially.   
 
As I wanted to know how political parties de facto act upon and view these issues, I 
decided to talk to minority rights organizations, given their experience of working 
with these issues. While the status of minority rights is dependent upon political 
commitment in terms of implementation and protection, these organizations are all 
aware of the party positions.  As their work is centralized around the monitoring of 
the legal, social and political status of minority rights, I judge their perspective as 
being highly valuable to the case. I have had the opportunity to talk to high-level 
representatives1, who provided me with their insights on how political parties stand in 
relation to their agenda.  
 
The interviews in Serbia were complemented with two interviews with prominent 
politicians. These interviews served as an opportunity to scrutinize their views on 
minority issues.  
 
Interviews were conducted with respect to the social process that it is, with the main 
goal of making it a ‘natural situation’. I hence left it up to the respondents to choose 
dates and place, and provided an overarching interview guide prior to our meeting.  
The interviews were recorded and the questions were structured in an open way in 
order not to inflict any bias, arguing that this leaves space for the interviewees to 
frame the political positions on minority rights according to their perspective. The                                                         
1 The appendices offers a detailed presentation of the organizations and the respondents that has 
participated in this study.   
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questions were framed more narrowly towards my propositions by the end – giving 
the respondent possibility to elaborate on more specific issues. I eventually aimed at 
concluding each interview in a summary, in order to avoid any arbitrary 
interpretations or misconceptions.2   
 
All interviews were conducted to scrutinize the political context of how parties profile 
themselves on these different issues, and additional attention was paid to the political 
parties in a comparative perspective. In order to get the broad and the specific picture, 
interviews were conducted with LGBT- and ethnic minority organizations. The 
biggest advantage of conducting field research was the exploratory process, as the 
experience allowed me to ask more accurate and challenging questions. The 
interviews hence relied on a very general interview guide to ensure not to lose track of 
the research questions, but ruled out a strictly detailed questionnaire. To not adjust 
and adapt the interview questions would indicate a failure to take advantage of the 
knowledge earned during the process.  
 
I decided not to include any documents in the study, as very little is written about 
minority rights, and as very few political parties would write anything that could be 
interpreted as less supportive or negative in this regard.  
5.5 Building the explanation 
 
Whereas the material has been collected to provide information on how the selected 
parties respond to LGBT-rights, the analysis has been done to stipulate the causal link 
between these reactions and ideology. The propositions of this inquiry are the product 
of an iterative process, standing as an explanatory test to the ideological positions on 
LGBT-rights in Serbia and Croatia. 
 
As the propositions show how ideology is conceptualized and treated within the 
study, the material has consequently been coded and analysed step by step in relation 
to the propositions and judged in accordance with these claims. The analytical work is 
a qualitative test as to whether views on ethnic minority rights have informed party 
response to LGBT-rights. 
 
The analysis has relied on two strategies, one being precaution to scrutinize the 
propositions – the other a pathway towards building the explanation. The first strategy 
was to examine rivalling explanations, as the theoretical claims cannot be confirmed                                                         
2 All of the respondents gave me the permission to refer to them by their full name in the thesis. Even if 
LGBT-rights and ethnic minority rights can be a sensitive issue in Serbia and Croatia, I decided to not 
anonymize the names of the respondents. Given the nature of the respondents’ work and their activism, 
they are already publicly known for their opinions and the agenda of their organization. The 
respondents were also positive to this open way of presenting the interviews, as the thesis serves as an 
opportunity for them to express their views on minority rights. If any of the respondents would have 
been hesitant or if the social situation would have been more fragile, I would have judged a need for 
anonymization. As none of the respondents wished to be anonymous I saw few ethical reasons to 
anonymize, while also judging that the use of full names leads to a more genuine and interesting 
empirical presentation.   
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without careful consideration to alternative variables. The second strategy relates 
directly to the explanation building, which matches the empirically based pattern with 
the theoretical proposition. (Yin, 2009, pp. 130-143).   
 
I decided to not complement the hypotheses with an analytical model, as ideology is 
hard to classify into certain categories and measure with accuracy. Instead, I relied on 
questions in relations to the claims to get the best picture on how political parties are 
profiled.3 The results have therefore been presented in narrative form in relation to the 
propositions, serving as an explanatory picture of the findings in the field.   
 
The results are presented in relation to the propositions, elaborating on 1) how ethnic 
relations interplayed with political structures, and 2) how this has informed different 
ideological prospects of LGBT-rights among political parties.  
5.6 Strengths and limitations of the study 
 
Comparative politics are commonly subject to quantitative research, where broad 
patterns are analysed through large-N statistical material. Such research has great 
potency to paint the broad picture to the relationship between phenomenon and 
context, but is less valid in terms of explaining how these patterns are manifested in 
their social context. The major strength of this thesis lies within its design, which 
brings more validity to the subject while scrutinizing party preferences on LGBT-
rights in their natural setting. To have the possibility to explore this relationship in 
field has been a major advantage as it has allowed for an insight into the social 
context. To step closer to the studied phenomenon can reveal details and 
characteristics that are vaguely appearing from a bird’s-eye view, and has potential to 
bring more clarity to the detail. 
 
But it also puts a critical finger to the most common critique to qualitative research 
and the case study approach; How to protect the thesis from subjective judgements 
and personal bias? 
 
Foremost by having ensured that the research is conducted systematically, enabling 
the reader to follow the process from the building of theory to the analysis of the 
result. The structure of the process is the mechanism that distinguishes the academic 
process from standard reasoning, and assumptions from evidence (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011, pp. 39-49). The case study is a way to construct validity, under 
condition that it is clear both where the boundaries of the study are drawn and the 
steps of how the inquiry is operationalized are presented.  
 
An important step to protect the explanatory case study from flaws starts at the case-
selection, as a solid case to a certain extent defends itself. While motivating the 
choices and demonstrating the research process, this case is made as coherent as                                                         
3 I.e. ”Conflict over ethnic minority rights distinguished political parties”. If so, how was this 
distinction manifested? What were the implications? Are there alternative explanations? 
  20 
possible. The same measures are an antidote to the risk of inaccurate inference, as 
substantial knowledge about the case and clearly defined boundaries reduces the risk 
of confusion (Flyvberg, 2011). 
 
Awareness of these flaws is essentially a pre-condition for the quality, as unawareness 
would signal a bias in terms of an uncritical way of reasoning (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011, pp. 251-253). A critical way of thinking has guided this research, but despite 
measures and precautions, this study is bound to have weaknesses - some of them 
related to the nature of the research, others to the research design.  
 
A weakness of the research problem is the concept of ‘ideology’, whose meaning will 
always be contextual and relative. It is naturally flexible and entails a set of values 
that are not necessarily coherent or easily operationalized. Similar difficulties apply to 
concepts such as  ‘norms’ and ‘values’. These concepts are close to the nature of 
human action and have been discussed in a philosophical tradition far beyond this 
study. I believe social phenomena can only be coded and operationalized to a certain 
extent, as it always involves a certain degree of simplification. Consideration to the 
balance between transparency and structure, on the one hand, and flexibility on the 
other, has hence been guiding this research process.  
 
This consideration has been done to ensure that the study is credible, by clearly 
illustrating how the material is treated and how the conclusions are drawn.  
 
Another possible weakness lies within the material, which consists exclusively of 
interviews. It would have been beneficial to access other sources to strengthen the 
explanation, but as no adequate documentation was retrievable, it could potentially do 
more harm than good to the overall quality. At the same time, the lack of 
documentation on the subject underlines the need for qualitative research.  
 
The strength of this contribution is that it is deduced from recent quantitative evidence 
on the subject, serving as a strong point of departure for the construction of a valid 
theory. This theory is the central part of the research design, guided by the aim to 
comprise the different perspectives of the material into a fair and coherent picture.  
The study furthermore relies on propositions to ensure transparency, with the 
ambition of clearly showing how the research problem is treated and whether or not 
the explanation applies to the case.  
 
The inquiry is driven by the theory to test whether the claims are valid to the case and 
has no ambitions to generalize beyond these boundaries. It does, however, discuss 
possible implications of the findings in a wider context.  
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6. Results 
 
This chapter presents the empirical findings and elaborates on how the material 
stands in relation to the propositions. The first part illustrates how the politicization 
of ethnicity informed a norm for political structures, the second part elaborates on 
how this has informed different ideological prospects for LGBT-rights between the 
parties in Serbia and Croatia. 
6.1 The ethnic norm and ‘the other’ 
 
On March 22nd this year I was walking through Belgrade, anticipating the 
qualifications to the world championship in football. The game was played in Zagreb, 
about five hours by car from Belgrade. A previous agreement had been made with 
reference to the fragile security situation, not allowing for Serbian fans to attend. This 
was the first match ever to be played between Serbia and Croatia, and on each side 
stood two coaches, Mijailovic and Stimac, previously prominent teammates in the 
Yugoslav youth team. Then came the war, whose long chain of events made 
archenemies of the two, creating an outright animosity between them. Now, 23 years 
later, they might never forgive each other, but both agreed that the game be peaceful, 
in consensus about sparing coming generations from war that had plagued them and 
their generation (Niva, March 20th, 2013). 
 
As the referee blew the whistle in Zagreb, the Serbian National Anthem was drowned 
out by chants from the Croatian crowd. Ustasa songs were sung, praising the fascist 
regime of the Second World War by which thousands of Serbs were killed. 
Simultaneously, heavy police resources were patrolling the streets of Belgrade.  
   
“Behavior of people in the stadium was really bad… And you could hear calls like 
“Kill the Serb, Kill the Serb, Kill the Serbs!” organized by Croatian team fans. 
Sometimes I feel like the war is not over at all.” BJ28/034 
 
This is an extreme example, but ethnic sentiments are still having social and political 
importance. While some ethnic minorities are at the heart of the political debate, 
others are seen in a more neutral context. Respondents indicated that contradiction 
arises only when political power is at stake, whereas the relationship otherwise is less 
strained, or perhaps, less relevant to political life. Minorities who were not directly 
involved in the wars are consequently treated in a more neutral sense than those who 
were having meaning to territorial stability.  
 
As suggested by theory, this is the political aftermath of the ethnic conflict, where the 
worst events even took the form of ‘ethnic cleansing’, and it was not only evident in 
Srebrenica but in Krajina in Croatia and other parts of Bosnia. It illustrates how the                                                         
4 The respondents are consequently referred to by [intials + interview date]. Further information about 
the respondents and the organizations are found in Appendix 1 and 2. 
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political authoritarianism exploited ethnicity as a means for organization and power. 
This enhanced ethnic distinctions, which still serves as a fundament for a strong 
nationalist norm.    
 
“For example, you have to say you’re a Croat to be able to be a vice-president… It is 
this kind of insane understanding of what human beings are, and reducing that to 
ethnicity. While the conflict is basically between nationalists and people who wants to 
be citizens.” JV 18/04 
 
The nature and the extent of this conflict is of big significance, and how citizens 
declare themselves ethnically is still a determinant to constitutional rights of being 
able to acquire political office. The political structures are built upon an ethnic 
nationalism, and the ethnic distinction between certain groups still manifests potency 
as a political trajectory. This ethnic distinction between different groups seems to 
have a spill-over effect on the political thought, where issues are not dealt with in a 
universal perspective, but rather departs from a majority-minority divide. Hence, most 
social and cultural features that deviate from this norm are subject to some kind 
classification in light of this majority-minority way of defining these issues. 
 
The first proposition claims that the politicization of an ethnic identity is central to the 
political developments, the findings indicate that this is reflected in the majority-
minority divide. The material furthermore suggests that ethnic identity serves as a 
normative frame, entailing rules and values that make for this collective ethnic 
identification. The ethnic distinction hence become salient as a pre-requisite for the 
constitution of difference, where ethnic relations reveal clear potential as a political 
trajectory. Ethnicity is the guiding theme to this normative frame, and ethnic identity 
of the majority is created and consolidated in contrast to ethnic minorities, emerging 
as ‘the other’.  
 
The respondents suggested that ethnic relations are salient to political structures while 
serving as a source of identification between the majority and ‘the other’, hence 
increasing the affiliation between the political sphere and the broad electorate. This 
affinity is an effective way to build higher political credibility, which is why ideology 
tends to be aligned to this norm.  
 
“The prevailing tendency, for the entire region, is that we have these pre-political 
attitudes. There is an ongoing struggle in our countries to identify the citizenship to 
ethnicity. There is an ethnic nationalism.” MM 03/21  
 
The relationship to ethnicity as such does not reflect a simple standpoint, but critically 
concerns the affiliation with a cluster of features that adds to an ethnic identity. While 
the overarching norm is stipulated by ethnic sentiments, it also brought along with it 
standards for expected and accepted cultural praxis within these frames. The extent to 
which political parties emphasize this norm tends to inform their views of appropriate 
action, and vice versa, their reaction to social praxis that falls aside the scope of this 
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norm. The ideology seems to be stipulated by the ethnic norm, and ‘otherness’ is that 
what goes beyond these boundaries. Ethnic minority issues are hence salient to the 
construction of ideology as they constitute a difference, how political parties approach 
this difference is a clear value-commitment and reflect the extent to which political 
actors recognize ‘the other’.  
 
Ethnic minority rights might not necessarily be denied or rejected, but they always 
remain minority issues and that constitutes a problem for dealing with core of the 
problem, as one interviewee put it – “this segregated multi-culturalism”. It reveals a 
persistent obstacle to understand and recognize ‘the other’, sometimes serving as a 
barrier to anticipate other values. This tendency reappears in the political structures, 
while it does not only imply segregation of people in accordance with ethnicity, but 
crucially reveals a tendency to segregate different values in relation to an overarching 
ethnic norm. 
 
As being suggested by the theory, this construct of ‘the other’ is a big point of 
political distinction, hence influencing the political structures in terms of values.  
 
The debate furthermore shows a tendency to depart from the scope of normality, as 
clear distinctions between minority and majority relations had been drawn. One 
respondent meant that this is the general problem with minority rights, that the 
distance between the communities creates a lack of understanding towards ‘the other’.   
 
“Everything that is different from the majority of the population is subject to some 
kind of non-understanding and even to hate. It has come to the extreme that you hate 
everything what is different, basically. Unlike Sweden, people don’t get the 
opportunity to see different things; they don’t see different religion that often, and 
especially, they don’t see different ethnicities.” GM 12/03 
 
The salience of ethnic minority issues has decreased, and it would be to present a 
tragically misleading picture to claim that elections in Serbia and Croatia revolves 
back and forth around minority rights. The elections are, as in every state in the world, 
concerned about taking responsibility for the state and future challenges to come. The 
major crux is that taking responsibility for the state is associated with different values, 
much connected to this ethnic nationalism, which have bred a competitive fundament 
for party competition that is not unproblematic.  
 
Interviews importantly indicated that these issues might not appear politically because 
they are “important to the average citizen”, but become an easy way to distract the 
general public from a debate over other issues. One of the most obvious roles of 
ethnic minority issues in the political debate hence seems to be how they constitute 
value statements that are central to how political parties profile themselves. It 
critically shows how prior ethnic distinctions develop into ideological differences.  
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“The whole region is not dealing with those issues in the right way, and it became 
ideology. Governments didn’t have the strengths to deal with real issues, so they are 
really always having a cradle in nationalism. Whenever something is wrong, you can 
go a few steps back and really disturb some minority issues.” MA 24/04 
 
Ethnic relations are not a primordial phenomenon in the context, but there is an ethnic 
norm that is associated with a certain set of values. The extent to which political 
parties are affiliated with this norm seems to guide different prospects for appropriate 
behaviour, and ultimately frame how they recognize ‘the other’. The tendency seems 
to be stipulated by the degree to which values that deviates from this norm is 
recognized or rejected, in turn connected to the previous conflicts. 
 
These findings confirms many of the claims, while illustrating how distinctions with 
reference to the ethnic norm constructs ‘the other’, furthermore that this is a central 
component in the construct of ideology as such.   
 
Ethnic minority issues have formed persisting social relations, which are accumulated 
and reflected in the political structures. The conflict over ethnic minority rights has 
underpinned the political ideology in the sense that it revolves around a strong ethnic 
norm. The tendency in the material is that the ideological values are stipulated by this 
ethnic norm and based on the affiliation to these related values.  
 
“You must always think about the war, and the ethnicity is a thing of primary political 
definition of yourself, so everybody will have and will state their opinion very clearly 
about it. But LGBT-rights are not seen as Human Rights, so it’s very hard to compare 
the notion that it is a question like the [ethnic] minority right.” KHC 29/03 
 
The LGBT-community currently manifests a distinct form of ‘otherness’ in relation to 
the existing heterosexual norm. The notion of LGBT-rights is a highly sensitive 
subject in Serbia, while also being very controversial in Croatia. The most interesting 
finding is that ethnic minority rights and LGBT-rights are treated as two completely 
different subjects in political life in Serbia as well as in Croatia. Interviews indicated 
that all political parties are aware and understanding to what ethnic discrimination is, 
whereas LGBT-rights is subject to a lack of understanding and seen in a separate 
context.  
 
“If you can recognize that it is bad and wrong to talk about Serbs badly in the main 
newspaper, how can you not realize it is discriminatory to talk in the same way about 
gays?! People don’t see the parallel.” KHC 29/03 
 
At the same time, the empirical evidence shows that there is a correlation between 
how political parties respond to LGBT-rights and their prior position on ethnic 
minority rights.  The strong tendency in the material is that the ideological values are 
stipulated by the affiliation to the ethnic norm, and that this guides the degree to 
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which other values are accepted. It explains why political parties have chosen 
different ideological pathways and how they respond to the idea of LGBT-rights. 
 
6.2 Croatia: The ‘Serb issue’ and ideology 
 
As the political parties in Croatia are placed at an ideological crossroad, their choice 
of direction is guided by conflicting views on ethnic minority rights and post-war 
stances. The HDZ is oriented towards a nationalism and possible conflict, whereas 
the SDP takes a quiet and more neutral path. The findings reveal that these pathways 
end up at different stances on LGBT-rights, and paradoxically, that the neutral path 
might be the most controversial.  
 
The Serb minority recently caused a big debate, when having applied for bilingual 
signs in the town of Vukovar. In accordance with the Croatian constitution, any 
minority within a municipality that constitutes over 30% of the population is entitled 
to this cultural right. While being treated in the institutional setting, the ruling 
coalition headed by the SDP saw no problems in implementing the law and give the 
Serb minority the bilingual rights granted by the constitution. But the HDZ evidently 
turned it into a problem, and their reaction was strongly affective. 
 
The anti-Serb sentiments inherited since the wars still have an important place in 
Croatian politics, where the rhetoric has turned intense. Ruza Tomasic, MP of the 
“Croatian Party of Rights” was recently broadcasted on state-television, declaring that 
the “Serbs in Croatia are chetnik” and that “Croatia is for the Croats, and all others 
are guests”. Together with the HDZ, they will be entering the elections for the 
European Parliament on a common platform on the 19th of May.  
 
This illustrates that minority rights are still a salient issue to the political competition, 
while also indicating that prior positions on the issue are consolidated. The HDZ has 
been the guard of national interest, enforced by nationalism since the war of 
independence. The party largely builds their political ideology on these past actions, 
as the state-bearing party fighting not only for the interest of Croatia but for ethnic 
Croats, while relying on the authoritarian legacy. How the party recognizes the 
present “Serb situation” is linked to an overarching anti-Serb ideology, and subject to 
affective reactions.  
 
“These blood issues, so, blood identity, in the sense that “this is how you’re born, and 
this is what you are”. They seem to become much more vibrant and active in pre-
election campaign periods.” JB 27/03 
 
Although, the situation admits to higher complexity, as the HDZ might not see other 
minorities as a particular issue. During the accession negotiations with the EU, the 
HDZ has dealt with many minority issues, and ruled in coalition with other minority 
parties, even including the Serb Democratic Party. Many respondents meant that the 
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HDZ has done most for minority rights in Croatia, while being in government as new 
legislation was implemented during the accession process. Although the HDZ builds 
largely on the importance of this ethnic classification, minorities are welcomed to 
fight for their cause politically, through national councils and other parties than the 
HDZ. This illustrates a more moderate approach, while still revealing reluctance 
among the ex-authoritarian HDZ to embrace and recognize ‘the other’.  
 
“The approach of the HDZ is basically, OK, form your own political party and fight, 
but it’s like they don’t want anything to do with it.” DDO 29/03 
 
The SDP is the main challenger to HDZ, and serves as a liberal alternative. The SDP 
emerged as a silent opposition in the 1990’s, eventually discredited by their 
communist past as the wars erupted. This has informed a persisting standpoint, and 
the party is less concerned with whether someone is minority or majority. The 
respondents underlined that most minorities voted for the SDP, and that the party 
never raised problems in this minority-majority perspective. The party also have the 
largest share of minority members, with many Serbs in official positions. However, 
the policy of the SDP is to avoid minority issues, and the minority members are 
members as social democrats, not being encouraged to lift specific minority issues in 
the party. But avoiding minority issues also caused a disappointment among minority 
groups, as many claim that the SDP was incapable of pushing important aspects. 
 
This contradiction seems to be a product of the influence of strong ethnic-
authoritarian forces headed by the HDZ, painting a picture of the SDP as traitors of 
the national interest. This discourse seems to have put a straight-jacket on the 
pluralist-liberal position, while the formerly authoritarian forces still monopolize the 
nationalist discourse. There is still a strong ethnic sentiment, from which HDZ 
benefits while having the inherited role as a guard of Croatian interests. This rhetoric 
is also clearly evident and exposed, used to stigmatize the SDP and the liberal wing as  
non-patriotic.  
 
There is hence difference in the recognition of the minority issue, rooted in whether it 
should be seen in ‘ethnic’ or ‘plural’ terms. This cleavage between the parties tends to 
define their political platform in absence of more salient issues. Whereas the HDZ is 
aligned to an ethnic agenda, the SDP tends to see the citizenship in plural terms.  
 
“The problem, which we are seeing now, is that the main motivation, from my point of 
view, why the left and the right is talking about minorities – it’s because it’s the only 
area that is left to them to define themselves as a left and right.” GB 28/03 
 
The salience of this conflict reveals ideological values beyond whether or not 
minorities should have their rights, it importantly signals broader social preferences. 
The recurring tendency is that it revolves around the notion of ‘the other’, and the 
extent to which ‘the other’ is recognized. Whereas the HDZ is closely aligned to the 
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ethnic norm, they tend to have a more narrow approach. Contrary, the SDP makes for 
a more neutral and inclusive approach.   
 
This ideological debate has travelled to present time and is reflected in competing 
visions on the status of LGBT-rights, where a very similar ideological pattern is 
reproduced. The HDZ prove reluctant and non-supportive, whereas the SDP is fully 
committed to LGBT-rights as such. This entails a set of broader values, where the 
debate has condensed from two extremes (formerly authoritarian vis-à-vis pluralist) to 
a more moderate liberal-conservative setting.  
 
The SDP recently introduced changes in the health education, which includes sexual 
education, proposing to remove the catholic values and replace them with more 
gender-neutral material. This provoked a strong counter-reaction from the HDZ who 
was being opposed to this material. The discrepancy in these positions illustrates how 
the ideological structure is reproduced, with the HDZ expressing concerns of tradition 
and morale, and the SDP defending its position in terms of liberalism.  
 
“Social Democrats don’t emphasize any kind of separate identity, except social 
democratic or leftist or whatever, I would say it’s very communist, a heritage from the 
communist time.” MJ 27/03 
 
In contrast, the HDZ increasingly incorporated catholic values as a part of their 
ideology. The LGBT-rights activists were concerned with the lack of interest and 
understanding from the HDZ in relation to the Pride, which has been a controversial 
topic. The HDZ never forbid the Pride Parade, but their rhetoric on the issue is clearly 
conservative. Respondents meant that the respect for the Pride was much a response 
to the EU-accession. Particular criticism concerned statements in regards to the 
attacks on the Split Pride in 2011, which were condemned in terms of “violence is 
always bad, we don’t respect violence between people”. They hence avoided to speak 
of this as homophobia, or mentioning the problem with homophobia. Contrary, the 
SDP has, together with the liberal Croatian People’s Party, shown full support to the 
Pride, while having representatives present at the Parade and currently being 
committed to new legislation as regards same-sex partnerships.  
 
This conflict illuminates how the former debate on ethnic minorities and citizenship 
has expanded and transferred to broader values, with views on sexual minorities being 
very obvious. The norm of what is appropriate and acceptable hence seems to be 
labelled in open or narrow terms in accordance with pre-existing ideological 
preferences. The HDZ, relying on a more conservative part of the electorate, has 
formed a closer bond to the state by aligning more closely with the church. As it goes, 
the party shows reluctance to LGBT-rights together with a lack of understanding. The 
SDP is promoting a more secular state, shows full support for the rights of the LGBT-
community in terms of equal citizens’ rights.  
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“It’s an ideological difference, the relations to LGBT-rights is basically the same that 
the so-called left and the so-called right have to ethnic minorities.” JB 28/03  
 
This constitutes an example of how the debate over values is structured in a broader 
perspective in accordance with the ethnic norm. This is critically shown by the 
emotional and affective reaction of the HDZ, whereas the SDP is promoting a 
separation between church and state in more pragmatic terms.   
 
An additional important factor that seems to have lasted since the 90’s is also the rules 
of the game, i.e. the legitimacy to exercise authority and to open sensitive issues. This 
is closely related to the public trust, and the social democracy and social liberalism 
still tend to be subordinate to effective emotional arguments from a conservative 
angle. Many respondents were concerned about “afraid politicians” and the fear of 
“stirring things up” in the public debate, as this is a moral minefield that the HDZ 
navigates with higher credibility. It can hence be more controversial to contradict the 
ethnic sentiment than to embrace it. Why?  
 
The ideology and credibility of the HDZ has been built on this sentiment since the 
wars, whereas the SDP was more alienated from these values. This structure has 
stipulated the ideological directions. 
 
6.3 Serbia: LGBT-rights under national grievances 
 
The ideological pathways in Serbia depart from a scenario similar to that in Croatia, 
but are seemingly restrained by unresolved national grievances. The DS emerged on 
the path to deal with unresolved issues that was born and sustained under the rule of 
SPS. The pathways are still clearly stipulated by this conflict, but the direction of the 
DS, on the one side, and the SPS and SNS on the other, are not as clearly 
distinguished. LGBT-rights is an archetypical example of an unresolved issue, being 
on an ideological domain which the DS claim as theirs, and which SPS and SNS are 
unaware of how to navigate.   
 
“Well, if you want to know if a party is liberal or conservative in Serbia, three simple 
questions are enough. What’s your position on Kosovo? Was Srebrenica genocide? 
What do you think about European integration?” LB 03/05    
 
The theoretical propositions refer to a liberal-pluralist pole, whose answer would be 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence, full responsibility of Srebrenica and 
anticipation of the EU. The ethnic-authoritarian side would on the contrary be defined 
by rejecting or taking ambivalent positions on these issues; i.e. Kosovo is an historical 
part of the Serb entity, Srebrenica was complex and “yes it was a crime but…”, as 
well as an ambivalent position on European integration.  
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As suggested by the theory, the approach to these issues is reflecting a broader value-
commitment and is highly salient to how political parties are profiled. Respondents 
have suggested that the approach to these ethnic relations and especially past 
grievances remain an important distinction in Serb politics. As these issues remain 
sensitive, they still serve as a watershed between conservative and liberal values and 
are central to how political parties are profiled.   
 
The DS emerged as the pluralist-liberal alternative during the wars, profiled as the 
party taking Serbia to the EU and to handle the difficult post-war relations in the 
region. The party was the major actor in the broad opposition that defeated the 
Milosevic-regime, and their president Zoran Djindjic became Prime Minister of 
Serbia in 2000. Many respondents elaborated on the large impact Djindjic had on the 
Serbian society, with a responsible approach to dealing with the past and the 
international relations.  
 
“That was the time when you had real progress of protection of minority rights– he 
understood the concept, for sure. So he understood what are the values of Serbia as a 
multiethnic country with respect to minorities.” MA 23/04 
 
When Djindjic was assassinated in 2003, Serbian politics seem to have experienced a 
formative moment, as reforms stopped and minority issues were left in a status quo. 
The DS still remained in power until the 2012 elections, when they suffered a major 
defeat to the SNS and SPS in coalition. 
 
These parties (together with more radical nationalist parties) have the heritage of the 
ethnic-authoritarian approach to the critical issues; not being concerned about taking 
account for previous actions, opposed to Kosovo’s independence, and sceptical to 
European integration. By rhetoric and previous actions, these ethnically associated 
issues served as a base for their ideology in terms of prior territorial pretensions and a 
“Greater Serbia”. This view is influenced by social conservatism, as the Orthodox 
Church played an important role in this process. The SNS and the SPS have the 
majority of voters in the poorer, rural areas, which are more traditional. They have 
constructed their ideology on nationalism and ethnic sentiments, remain conservative 
and are opposed to take account for previous war crimes. It brings about a critical 
question: Can those who are not committed to deal with past atrocities, and who used 
to be strongly conservative, be sensible to LGBT-rights? 
 
“It’s hard to break the prejudice and the attitudes that they have. They were for war, 
and now we’re expecting them to be pro-LGBT, it’s not going to be easy, it’s not 
going to happen.” JT 10/04  
 
The SNS and the SPS cultivated ethnic nationalism and it as the central part of their 
agenda. Interviews stated that the creation of this norm enforced conservative values, 
which presently serves as a barrier to LGBT-rights. As follows, the voting base of 
these parties consists primarily of those who supported these conservative claims 
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inherited since the Milosevic-era, whereas the voters of the SNS primarily are former 
voters of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). And maybe this is not so unexpected, as 
the party emerged as a fraction from the SRS, and the current elite in the party is 
former deputies of war criminal Vojislav Seselj.  
 
“You know, they are very close to those who are very radical, who are really a 
danger for the society. So they know what those groups are capable of doing, and I 
think that now, they are becoming more and more afraid of this violence.” MA 24/04 
 
The crucial finding in Serbia is that it is very unclear where these parties stand on 
LGBT-rights, as the SPS is seen as possibly changed ex-conservatives and the SNS as 
moderately changed ex-radicals. It is difficult to tell whether it is possible to deviate 
from a tradition of social conservatism and anticipate new values. All respondents 
indicated that their heritage in the ethnic-authoritarian tradition made them more 
alienated from the basic plural values. Hence, their approach to ‘the other’ is dubious, 
as their ideological legacy allowed for few values beyond the ‘ethnic norm’.  
 
While ethnicity underpinned the political ideology of the SPS and the SNS, it also 
defined the DS in terms of being opposed to the ethnic claims. The DS has biggest 
support in urban areas, is more secular, and closer to genuinely socially liberal parties 
such as the Liberal Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Union. The DS has a 
legacy of antagonizing the conservative and authoritarian aspects of the ethnic norm 
in this cultural sense, while emerging as a liberal counter-reaction to ethnic 
grievances. But as one respondent stated: “If you want to change the society, you have 
to change the views of people, the institutions and the education system.” MA 24/04 
 
The DS was facing a challenge in terms of the ethnic norm, which was strongly 
enforced by the authoritarianism under SPS. This involved challenges in terms of 
dealing with ethnic minority rights, grievances of war and the mentality that had been 
created. Ethnicity has guided a certain political mentality, and the DS was the main 
actor in extending that mentality to a plural system beyond the boundaries of these 
values. To accept LGBT-rights in Serbia critically translates into challenging 
conservative sentiments, and the progress relies upon how far political actors are 
willing to do this.  
 
The DS came to power and acquired the opportunity to challenge the conservative 
mentality and breed better prospects for a pluralist agenda, deviating from the ethnic 
nationalism to recognize ‘the other’ and hence also recognize LGBT-rights. However, 
following the assassination of Djindjic in 2003, the DS proved less effective in terms 
of enforcing liberal values. While in power, they seemed to have lost their credibility 
as they increasingly played ambivalently with nationalism, populism and 
democratization.  
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“When DS was in power, they did quite nothing to improve Human Rights, but they 
managed to produce completely irrelevant strategies and action plans that were never 
implemented.” JV 18/04 
 
The DS has emerged at a complex situation, neither being approved by the 
conservative and traditional part of the electorate, nor by the liberal voters. The 
conservative voting base assumes the DS is betraying the national interest, and the 
liberal block sees the party as traitors of the liberal agenda. The lack of a clear 
direction and liberal reform during the time DS was in power furthermore left an open 
space for the SPS and the SNS, who managed to take over the agenda that the DS 
sought to progress. Some of the respondents meant that the SNS is sending the same 
signals now as the DS, and that they could not tell the difference. The spokesperson of 
the DS expressed this fact in a quite simple way: 
 
“When you look at the party programs of the SNS and us, you might not see the 
difference… But there is a fundamental difference in our values and our ideology.”  
AJ 24/04 
 
AJ claimed that the DS had a sincere ambition of respecting diversity and liberal 
values, contrary to the SPS and the SNS who had bred the problematic fundament that 
the DS sought to challenge. The problem is that the difference that once was 
fundamental now appears as more marginal. This reflects upon the stances on LGBT-
rights, where the DS is clearly supportive but still not wholly committed to translate 
these values into action. 
 
What had previously been manifested as a distinct competitive pattern between an 
uncompromising ethnic-authoritarianism and a pro-democratic liberal block is 
vaguely defined at the moment of writing. It seems obvious that the ideological 
profile of the DS is more sensible and aware of the concept of LGBT-rights, but 
previous actions signal no real commitment. On the other side are the ex-radicals and 
the SPS, whose past legacy has revolved around social conservatism and ethnic 
grievances. 
 
“The DS really share and really feel these European values. So this is a clear 
difference between the three of them, the SNS and the SPS on one side, and the DS on 
the other.” JT 10/04 
 
But the scene where ethnic-authoritarianism and liberalism was clashing into each 
other seems to have faded, as both camps are oriented towards the (conservative) 
middle. The competition on LGBT-rights emerge as a typical symptom of this, having 
been left as one of many sensitive and controversial issues, where the DS is giving 
positive signals and the ruling coalition is ambivalent at best.  
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So, when ex-activist and founder of Gay-Straight Alliance Boris Milicevic decided to 
enter political life and become the first openly gay politician in 2010, he joined the 
executive board of the SPS in 2010. Why? 
 
“Because with the SPS, you know that they will do what they say. The DS became 
very populist, and when you become populist in a conservative state… You become 
conservative.” BM 07/05 
 
BM furthermore said that many activists felt provoked and frustrated when he joined 
the SPS, as the party has very limited support among minority rights activists. At the 
same time, Mr. Milicevic is, as many others, not supporting the idea of the Pride in 
Belgrade, as he did not “want to see broken legs, heads and teeth on state television, 
it’s a bad message for everyone”. However, no participants were hurt during the Pride 
in 2010, and critics see the ban as a direct failure of the protection of Human Rights. 
One could also reason that the decision to not allow the Pride indicates a lack of 
understanding and commitment to the democratic rights of the LGBT-community.   
 
The remarkable ideological distinction between pro and anti- positions on LGBT-
rights is hence to be found further to the nationalist vis-à-vis pluralist side of the 
political spectrum, where parties as the Liberal Democratic Party, the Social 
Democratic Union and United Regions of Serbia are showing clear support. On the 
nationalist side is the populist-conservative Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic 
Party of Serbia, being strongly opposed to LGBT-rights. This supports the fact that 
anti-positions on LGBT-rights are rooted in a broader sense, and that the preference 
on the issue tends to be a reaction with a clear association to underlying views on 
nationalism and ‘the other’.  
 
“We could see at the Pride Parade in 2010, that it was an attack on the state. They 
did not attack the gays, they attacked the U.S. Embassy, the mosque and the party 
head quarters.” JV 18/04 
 
“You know, at the Pride, you will hear them screaming that the participants are 
Ustasa, they’re seeing their enemy in them.” LB 03/05 
 
For political actors more closely aligned to nationalism, the Pride Parade clashes with 
the ethnic sentiment as an alien part of Serbian culture. The LGBT-community is seen 
in similar terms as the Ustasa, the former Croatian fascists, as a threat to the national 
culture. The liberal side rather sees the ethnic nationalism as a threat, while pushing 
for an inclusive pluralist agenda. This is closer to the point where the formerly ethnic-
authoritarian and pluralist-liberal worldviews still exist and meet in an ideological 
collision.  
 
The major parties in focus of this study emerge from opposite sides of this clash, but 
are currently navigating more moderately in between these tensions. The SPS and the 
SNS were an integrated part of the ethnic nationalism, still being responsible to a 
  33 
conservative electorate. The DS was the contender to the social conservatism that 
grew under the ethnic norm, but deviated from their agenda in claims for power. As a 
product, the ethnic grievances and the heritage of war still appear to remain unsolved 
in contemporary debate, spilling over to the LGBT-community whose destiny is 
positioned between a conservative norm of appropriateness and disparate mainstream 
reactions. The parties in focus of this study are currently less distinguished, while 
showing a clear tendency not to go in collision course with the ethnic sentiments.  
 
The SPS and the SNS once paved the fundament for the conservative norm, in which 
‘the other’ was ruled out and rejected. Paradoxically, they are now the ones who are 
in government and expected to push these boundaries. The DS originated as the 
pluralist-liberal alternative to challenge the norm, but the party seems to have adapted 
its ideology to be compatible with a conservative electorate and the ethnic sentiments 
that comes with it.   
 
Ideological questions of difference and diversity, and social liberalism as such, hence 
remain more disputed in Serbia. The position of ‘the other’ remains sensitive and 
unresolved. An event such as the Pride Parade remains highly controversial, as none 
of the main political parties have shown sufficient ideological commitment to support 
it. This has opened pathways further out to the extreme ends of the political spectrum, 
where nationalist conservatives and liberal parties contest the status of LGBT-rights.  
 
The ambivalence towards critical social divides in Serbia is evidently present, and 
ideology “used and misused” for personal gains. The conflict in Serbia suffers no lack 
of values or incitements, but more importantly, there is a lack of consolidated 
representation of these values within the political system. The ideological response to 
LGBT-rights is constrained within these frames. At the end of the day, the DS is the 
socially liberal party – but not to the extent that they commit full support to LGBT-
rights. On the other hand are the SPS and the SNS, whose lacking tradition the subject 
make them less credible.  
 
“When you speak about political parties here in Serbia you cannot determine their 
proper ideology so exactly, because we’re not mature in that sense in political party 
culture at all so they’re all making shifts regarding to the voting atmosphere.” MM 
21/03 
6.4 Summary of findings: A comparative picture 
 
Conflicting views on ethnic minority rights has shaped the ideological frame in Serbia 
and Croatia, but has produced more vaguely defined structures in Serbia. Whereas 
the positions in Croatia have been polarized along liberal-conservative stances, the 
political parties in Serbia admits to a similar structure but reflects a more ambivalent 
response to LGBT-rights. 
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The communist successor parties in Serbia and Croatia emerged from the common 
experience of violent transition with shared experiences but with different outcomes. 
These outcomes can be attributed to divergent issue dimensions, where the Serbian 
SPS was an active part of the ethnic conflict and the SDP was marginalized to the 
political periphery. Whereas the SPS turned into an authoritarian institution of Serbian 
territorial prospects of war, the SDP was discarded as Croatian nationalism grew. As 
followed, the SDP became (or decided to be) detached from the ethnic-authoritarian 
conflict that was being pursued and accelerated by the HDZ. The same logic applies 
to the DS in Serbia, being the pro-democratic contender to the SPS and against the 
wars.  
 
While the conflict stipulated a structure to political competition, it aligned political 
parties to different sides of the ethnic nationalism and the conflicts that came with it. 
These prospects largely concerned ethnic relations and territorial claims, which in turn 
distinguished parties by the affiliation to an ethnic norm and the values associated 
within this frame. The Croatian right (HDZ) and the Serbian left (SPS) accelerated the 
ethnic nationalism that became a major component of this norm, hence becoming 
closely aligned to these values.  
 
The extent to which these positions still informs current ideological differences has 
been illuminated in the course of this research, as these values are reproduced in 
different settings. It manifests potency for these past actions to serve as an ideological 
compass, being calibrated in accordance with roles the political parties inherited from 
previous conflicts. It ultimately seems to revolve around how ‘the other’ is 
recognized, manifested either by an inclusive or exclusive approach in accordance to 
prior ethnic affiliation. The affiliation to the ethnic norm eventually seems to be the 
overarching determinant to views on ‘the other’. 
 
These values comprise ideological tendencies, which affect how LGBT-rights are 
recognized and by which rules LGBT-rights as such are treated. What once erupted as 
a conflict between ethnic-authoritarian and pluralist-liberal forces now seems to have 
condensed into moderate liberal vis-à-vis conservative competition.  
 
The formerly authoritarian forces formed a closer bond to the ethnic state alongside 
the revived religion and conservative values that came with it. The ex-pluralist forces 
were opposed to this pattern, were more distanced from this process and acquired a 
more liberal agenda. This is reflected in the contemporary ideological conflict over 
LGBT-rights, where the formerly authoritarian parties are recognizing and treating the 
subject in more conservative terms than the former opposition parties.   
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 Summary: Party response to LGBT-rights 
 
Response to 
LGBT-rights 
Ideology Recognition Rules/Values 
SPS, SNS, HDZ Exclusive Affective Conservative  
SDP, DS  Inclusive Neutral Liberal  
 
 
The revival of ethnicity became a source of distinction and the formerly authoritarian 
political parties built the ideology around it, political rights hence became exclusive in 
accordance with ethnic affiliation. Vice versa, the more pluralist parties manifest a 
tendency to be inclusive, while having been less affiliated with ethnic claims.  
 
The trend in contemporary debate is that the Croatian right (HDZ) and the Serbian left 
(SPS) show reluctance or opposition to LGBT-rights, treating it in affective terms, 
rooted in tradition and emotions. Hence, their preferences resemble a more 
conservative approach. In contrast, the Serbian right (DS) and the Croatian left (SDP) 
are treating LGBT-rights in a more neutral context, where the status of the LGBT-
community is seen in more liberal terms and their status is recognized. It indicates an 
ideological difference of exclusion and inclusion, determining whether to recognize or 
to reject ‘the other’.  
 
The political left-right has hence acquired a distorted meaning across these cases, 
while these positions are associated with different values, largely rooted in the roles 
the political parties inherited from previous conflict. This illustrates how ethnic 
relations and prior conflict over ethnic minority rights has been a guiding theme to 
ideological formation, where ideological differences are being reproduced and 
reflected in different reactions to LGBT-rights. Hence, the left-right dimension does 
not explain party response to LGBT-rights – prior views on ethnic minority rights do.   
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7. Discussion 
 
This section engage a discussion on the findings in Serbia and Croatia, followed by 
an assessment in regards to how this inquiry stands in relation to previous literature 
on post-communist politics. The thesis eventually concluded in a few final remarks.  
7.1 On Pride and Prejudice 
 
Serbia and Croatia experienced a strong conservative turn under revived nationalism 
following the demise of ex-Yugoslavia, alongside a process of establishing borders 
and adapting to a new environment in the aftermath of communism. It was a period of 
confusion and tension, harvested by partisan political reactions. The radical 
nationalism allowed for few (if any) alternatives, and ethnic affiliation was exploited. 
Families of mixed ethnic marriages were disjoined, religious affinity awoken and 
many ex-Yugoslavs were forced into the wars. What formerly had been a cohesive 
federation became fragmented under violent circumstances and agitated by ethnic 
claims. Eventually, thousands of lives were sacrificed in order to clearly mark the 
borders.  
 
The bloodshed over these borders has left grievances, unresolved issues and a need 
for reconciliation. The borders might be a geographical distinction, but the socio-
cultural demarcations and political implications are significant. The borders were 
fought for by authoritarian means along ethnic lines, the ethnic norm hence became 
central to their content. The borders segregated not only people and territory but most 
importantly values. These values were largely historical, built upon national myths 
and grievances, and used to enhance the ethnic nationalism.  
 
This process can metaphorically be seen in terms of Pride and Prejudice, Pride as 
propaganda for ethnic claims and Prejudice towards diverging features. This seems to 
have been the central component to the formation of ideology: to enforce a collective 
Pride while similarly building Prejudice towards ‘the other’. The ethnic-
authoritarianism relied on ethnic pride, a social conservative view closely related to 
the values that make for an ethnic identification. The political opposition was 
seemingly less affiliated to this norm and hence less related to this value-laden 
discourse.  
 
As the LGBT-community demands equal rights, the right to remain visible and the 
right to protection - it is dependent upon political recognition and bound to seek 
political support. These demands place political parties at a junction; do they 
approach or avoid the demands? 
 
This study has shown that it provokes and clashes with the national Pride, in which 
both moderate and extreme nationalists forces unite in opposition to the LGBT-rights. 
These are challenged by liberal forces, being opposed to these values and recognize 
the political resistance to LGBT-rights as Prejudice. 
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These values of Pride and Prejudice are hence associated to organized political 
stances and entail an ideological cleavage in relation to ‘the other’. It shows how the 
birth of the seemingly uncompromising ethnic norm also gave birth to a liberal 
counter-reaction. 
7.2 On legacies of communism and social cleavages 
 
One part of the previous research has argued that political structures in post-
communist systems are a laggard product of the communist heritage. While implying 
that communism suffocated interests and organization, the ideology post-communism 
is seen in terms of vaguely defined messages that shifts between elections. It paints a 
rather dull picture of political life after communism, as the aftermath is perceived as a 
disparate political blur rather than a structured competition. 
 
The findings of this thesis vindicates that there is a clear political structure in Serbia 
and Croatia, being stipulated by how ethnic relations and federal structures interacted 
to inform political prospects. This thesis has theorized upon how this informed a 
critical social division, and shows that ethnic relations have been a guiding theme to 
ideological formation. The findings puts a finger on how ideology in Serbia and 
Croatia is constructed and reproduced, being closely related to how political actors are 
affiliated to an ethnic norm. The affiliation to these values is eventually a predictor to 
party response to critical social divides; the ideology is shaped by this conflict and 
accumulated within persisting standpoints. 
 
This ideological formation creates a structure to a political landscape that one side of 
the literature treats as unstructured. By strengthening the rationale that is explanatory 
to party response, this thesis stands critical to the claims of politics in Serbia and 
Croatia as diffuse and unorganized. The findings indicate that there is a structure to 
the conflict, but that it does not coincide with left-right positions across the cases, 
which might be misconceived as a lack of structure.   
 
These findings strengthen the picture that there is a structure, while showing why the 
left-right is associated with different values, while subsequently having explained how 
these values are manifested. It has confirmed that this is connected to conflicting issue 
dimensions, which entails different ideological directions.   
 
These findings furthermore challenge the validity of the structurally rooted theories, 
according to which conservative-liberal positions are determined by the variance in 
communist legacies. While arguing that the ideological outcome post-communism is 
the product of a structural heritage, it tends to lack consideration to issue-dimensions 
beyond the structural implications of communism. Ideology is hence perceived as 
inherited, and political action as instrumentally bound to institutional path-
dependence.  
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While this thesis sympathizes with the claim that political actors are more or less 
path-dependent, it remains sceptical to the claim that these paths are limited to 
structural choices.  
 
The findings in Serbia and Croatia illuminates that political parties have chosen 
different pathways, essentially inconsistent with the communist legacies. It has shown 
that ideological directions are rooted in the federal structures of Yugoslavia and 
affected by the dynamics of its collapse. This makes for an alternative issue 
dimension, where conflicting views on ethnic minority rights stipulated a competitive 
frame. As this emerged as a critical social divide, it polarized political parties in 
relation to the notion of ‘the other’ on the one hand, and a strong ethnic norm on the 
other. The extent to which political parties are affiliated to this ethnic norm 
furthermore reveals a clear tendency as to how they approach ‘the other’.  
 
This thesis has shown that these positions have an enduring capacity to explain how 
ideology is constructed, where parties are affiliated to different values that are 
stipulated by previous conflicts. The persisting ideological implications are reflected 
in party response to the LGBT-community, acquiring the role of the significant other. 
 
It suggests that the ideology is framed previous conflicts over ethnic minority rights, 
which stipulated how political parties are affiliated with nationalism. This is 
furthermore revealing an enduring potency to explain ideological reactions. It entails a 
structure to how parties react to social cleavages, being rooted in the affiliation to 
different values, stipulated by previous conflicts. This makes for a more adequate 
understanding to the political structures of Serbia and Croatia, while clearly 
illuminating the link between the conflict over LGBT-rights and prior ideological 
formation.  
 
These findings admit to a richer and more diverse picture of political life in the 
aftermath of communism, revolving around a clear conflict over values originating 
from a social dimension. Different social bases evidently interplayed with political 
structure to inform a dynamic relation in Serbia and Croatia, and party response to 
LGBT-rights is associated to these values.  
 
The theory on communist legacies gives a rich contribution to the systemic features of 
communism and their response to change, but to analyse Serbia and Croatia through 
this structural lens breeds a rather homogenizing picture. In assuming that the 
character of communism shapes the destiny of political life, there is a risk that the 
effect of communism as such and the endurance of these patterns are overemphasized.  
 
An important remark is even though that the propositions of this thesis and 
‘communist legacies’ do not have to be mutually exclusive. The specifics on the 
structural legacy might have informed the dynamics between the communist 
successor party and the opposition, and there is probably institutional detail that is 
valuable to this picture. Communist legacies are hence not irrelevant, but remain an 
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interesting framework to be able to understand and theorize upon post-communist 
structures. But while being limited to structural variables, it leaves few prospects to 
understand the interplay between social bases and political structures, and hence, 
between conflict over values and ideological formation. 
 
This thesis indicates that these dynamics have consolidated values that are 
explanatory to party response to LGBT-rights, which entails a rationale to ideological 
formation in Serbia and Croatia.  
7.3. Concluding remarks 
 
The findings of this thesis have challenged the perspective of ideology in Serbia and 
Croatia beyond sceptical assumptions on post-communist politics, while also 
extending the scope of ideology beyond explanations derived from communist regime 
legacies. It has given a deeper insight as to how ethnic relations guided the formation 
of ideology, and how it breeds different political prospects for LGBT-rights. While 
doing so, this thesis has also shown how ethnic nationalism has a potency to obstruct 
more differentiated plural values. It has shown how the dynamic between these two 
poles are associated into conflicting reactions on LGBT-rights. 
 
However, it is important to bear the notion in mind that ideology will always be 
relative to the context, and that social liberalism in this context is relative to the ethnic 
nationalism. That one actor is liberal does not necessarily translates into 
uncompromising support for LGBT-rights, and that one actor is nationalistic does not 
necessarily translate into relentless objections. This thesis has highlighted the broad 
pattern, sometimes being clearly reflected and at other times more subtle.  
 
The results metaphorically described the ideological orientation as pathways, ending 
up at a different standpoint towards ‘the other’. These pathways have confirmed the 
propositions, while simultaneously leading on to a number of interesting side tracks 
beyond the scope of this thesis. These issues might be in capacity of changing current 
structures, and as I see it, regards primarily two issues on the state-level.  
 
How will the political system in Serbia respond to Kosovo’s independence?  
And how will the political system in Croatia develop after the EU-accession? 
 
I believe that the outcome of these questions might have formative implications, being 
likely to reveal a clear direction to how the political parties profile themselves. I 
would strongly encourage further research to look into how these issues interplay with 
the ideological structures, and whether they enforce or undermine the remaining 
sentiments of the ethnic norm that currently exercise a clear effect on ideological 
pathways.  
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 Appendix 1: Interviews, Croatia 
 
Interviews being referred to as [initials + date], i.e. MM 27/03  
 
Date: 21/03 
Organization: Youth Initiative for Human Rights 
Length: [00:18:26] 
Respondent: Mario Mazic, Director 
 
Date: 27/03 
Organization: Zagreb Pride  
Length: [00:38:51] 
Respondent: Marko Jurcic, Coordinator of LGBT anti-discrimination policy  
 
Date: 27/03 
Organization: GONG (Civil Rights NGO) 
Length: [00:22:29] 
Respondent: Jelena Berkovic, Deputy Executive Director 
 
Date: 28/03  
Organization: Serb National Council 
Length: [00:45:10] 
Respondent: Branko Jurisic, Office Coordinator, former Liaison Officer at OSCE 
Kosovo. 
 
Date: 28/03 
Organization: Center for Peace Research 
Length: [00:17:01] + approx. 15 min off-tape 
Respondent: Gordan Bosanac, Head Policy Analyst  
 
Date: 29/03 
Organization: Roma National Council, Zagreb 
Length: [00:39:03] 
Interviewee: David D. Orlovic, Director/President 
  
Date: 29/03 
Organization: Zagreb Queer, Center for LGBT equality 
Length: [00:26:17] 
Respondent: Karla Horvat Crnogaj, Activist  
  
 Appendix 2: Interviews, Belgrade 
 
 
Date: 12/03 
Organization: Civil Rights Defenders 
Length: [00:34:03] 
Respondent: Goran Miletic, Program Officer for Western Balkans 
 
Date: 21/03 
Organization: Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 
Length: [00:27:19] 
Respondent: Maja Micic, Executive Director 
 
Date: 10/04 
Organization: Labris (Lesbian-Feminist NGO)  
Length: [00:40:51] 
Respondent: Jovanka Todorovic, Policy Coordinator 
 
Date: 18/04 
Organization: The Regional Center for Minorities (Minority Rights NGO) 
Length: [00:56:52] 
Respondent: Jovana Vukovic, Policy Coordinator 
 
Date: 24/04 
Organization: Democratic Party (DS) 
Length: [00:45:27] 
Respondent: Aleksandra Jerkov, Official Spokesperson 
 
Date: 23/04 
Organization: YUCOM (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights)  
Length: [00:48:21] 
Interviewee: Milan Antonijevic, Executive Director 
 
Date: 03/05 
Organization: NDI (National Democratic Institution) 
Length: [00:45:27] 
Respondent: Luka Bozovic   
 
Date: 07/05 
Organization: The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 
Length: [50:09] 
Respondent: Boris Milicevic, Member of the Executive Board 
  
 Appendix 3: Interview questions 
 
 
Interview guide 
 
Placing minority rights in the context 
 
* To what extent, according to your experience, is minority rights issues subject to 
political debate?  
 
- Sensitive?  
- Problematic?  
- Constructive?  
 
* Does your organization have any prioritized political aims? 
 
The political aspect of minority rights 
 
* Do you have any picture on which political parties that are more open to the agenda 
of your organization? 
 
- Legislative proposals? 
- Public statements?  
- Any parties that are specifically opposed? 
 
* Would you say that there is a clear political cleavage between actors who opposes 
minority rights and those who do not?  
 
- Alliances?  
- Disputes? 
 
* Does the position of political parties change over time? 
 
- Are they consistent, inconsistent?  
- Predictable?  
 
* Would you say that there is a difference between the political positions on LGBT-
rights and ethnic minority rights? 
 
- For example, does one party reject one but oppose the other? 
- If so, why do you think that is? 
 
Changes over time and current status of ethnic minority right 
 
* Would you say that the political positions has changed in any way over the years 
you have been active? 
 
-  If so, how?  
- To the better or the worse?  
 
 * Is there any specific existing legislation or law that has been introduced recently in 
favour of minority rights? 
 
- What specific political initiatives would you want to see in benefit of better 
inclusion of minorities?  
 
